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Prisoners Paying for the Costs of Their
Own Incarceration: United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal Spar Over the Validity
and Application of United States
Sentencing Guideline § 5E1.2(i)
I. Introduction
In an effort to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to
combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system,' the United
States Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19842
which established the United States Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
The Commission formulated sentencing policies and practices for the
federal criminal justice system designed to insure the ends of justice by
promulgating detailed guidelines3 prescribing the appropriate sentences
for offenders convicted of federal crimes.4 Section 5E1.2 dictates the
appropriate procedures and parameters to follow in imposing fines for
individual defendants and mandates that the court shall impose, in
addition to a punitive sanction, a fine that is at least sufficient to pay the
costs to the government of any imprisonment, probation, or supervised
release order.' Section 5E1.2(i), which specifically articulates that
prisoners must pay for the costs of their confinement, has created discord
among United States Circuit Courts of Appeal. Federal courts display
little consistency in their interpretation and application of section
5E1.2(i).
Specifically, the Circuit Courts of Appeal disagree over the validity
of the Section and the factors to consider in imposing a sanction against
criminal defendants designed to reimburse the government for the cost of
their imprisonment. Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit recently declared section 5E1.2(i) invalid.' Such
1. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Introduction to GUIDELINES MANUAL,
Ch.1, Pt.A. (1992) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
2. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-
3574, 3581-3586 (1988)).
3. The [Sentencing] Commission's initial guidelines were submitted to Congress on April 13,
1987. After the prescribed period of Congressional review, the guidelines took effect on November
1, 1987. Introduction to U.S.S.G., Ch.I, PLA.
4. Id.
5. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i).
6. See United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992).
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discord among the circuit courts makes the validity and proper application
of the section an issue worthy of Supreme Court consideration.
In Part II, this Comment traces the history of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines and the Congressional motivation behind their
creation. The Comment further examines the evolution of section 5E1 .2
and discusses the law as it exists today, articulating the different factors
sentencing judges consider in imposing the fine. The Comment proceeds,
in Parts III and IV, to illustrate the inconsistency among federal circuit
courts over their interpretation of the section and the disagreement among
the circuits on imposing a fine to reimburse the government for
incarceration costs. In Part V, the Comment examines both the
constitutionality and validity of section 5E1.2(i). Part VI concludes with




In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act"
[hereinafter the "Act"] designed to address the deficiencies of the criminal
justice system. The Act's basic objectives were (1) to combat crime
through an effective sentencing system; (2) to create reasonable
uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders; and
(3) to establish proportionality in sentencing through a system that
imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing
severity.8 Prior to the Act, the sentencing system was marked with
confusion and implicit deception. The preexisting process required the
court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and
empowered the parole commission to determine how much of the
sentence an offender actually would serve in prison. This resulted in a
substantial reduction in the effective length of the sentence imposed, with
defendants often serving only about one-third of the sentence imposed by
the court.9 The Act created the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Commission and delegated broad authority to the Commission to review
and rationalize the federal sentencing process. ° At least three of the
7. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-
3574, 3581-3586 (1988)).
8. Introduction to U.S.S.G., Ch. I, Pt.A.
9. Id.
10. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1993) codifies the powers of the Commission. The Statute provides:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
members of the Commission must be federal judges, not more than four
of the members must be members of the same political party, and the
United States Attorney General serves as an ex officio, nonvoting
member." The Commission's primary duty is to promulgate guidelines
for sentencing judges to use in determining the appropriate sentence in
criminal cases. 2
Congress found the present system's deficiencies rooted in the
absence of both a comprehensive federal sentencing law and statutory
guidance on how to select the appropriate sentencing option. These
deficiencies resulted in inevitable disparity in the sentences which courts
imposed on similarly situated defendants. 3 Congress traced the root of
these disparities to the unfettered discretion the law confered on those
judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing
the sentence.' 4  Specifically, the United States Senate refered to the
(a) there is established as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United
States a United States Sentencing Commission which shall consist of seven voting
members ....
(b) The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to:
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system
that (A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553
(a)(2) of Title 18, United States Code; (B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the
purposes of sentencing, avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct which maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing
practices; and (C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process ....
28 U.S.C. § 991 (1993).
II. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1993).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1993).
13. Act of Oct. 11, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 41.
14. Id. at 38. Congress articulated the following goals for sentencing reform:
First, sentencing legislation should contain a comprehensive and consistent statement of
the Federal law of sentencing, setting forth the purposes to be served by the sentencing
system and a clear statement of the kinds and lengths of sentences available for federal
offenders. Second, it should assure that sentences are fair both to the offender and to
society, and that such fairness is reflected both in the individual case and in the pattern
of sentences in all Federal criminal cases. Third, it should assure that the offender, the
Federal personnel charged with implementing the sentence, and the general public are
certain about the sentence and the reasons for it. Fourth, it should assure the availability
of a full range of sentencing options from which to select the most appropriate sentence
in a particular case. Fifth, it should assure that each stage of the sentencing and
corrections process, from the imposition of sentence by the judge, and as long as the
offender remains within the criminal justice system, is geared toward the same goals for
the offender and for society.
id. at 39.
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"outmoded rehabilitational model for federal criminal sentencing," and
recognized that the efforts of the criminal justice system had failed."
The Sentencing Guidelines [hereinafter "guidelines"] were
promulgated in an attempt to rectify these disparities and to establish
uniformity in the sentencing process. The guidelines cover offenses
against the person and offenses involving property; public officials; drugs;
criminal enterprises and racketeering; fraud or deceit; prostitution; sexual
exploitation of minors; obscenity; individual rights; the administration of
justice; public safety; immigration; naturalization; passports; national
defense; food; agricultural products; odometer laws; prisons and
correctional facilities; the environment; money laundering and monetary
transaction reporting; taxation; and antitrust offenses. 6  For each
offense, the guidelines dictate the appropriate punishment and the factors
for judges to take into consideration in imposing the sentence.
In Mistretta v. United States 7 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the guidelines and the validity of a Congressional
infusion of authority into the Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
Minstretta argued that the establishment and empowerment of the
Commission violated the separation of powers principle and that Congress
had delegated the excessive power to the Commission." Specifically,
Minstretta contended that the Commission possessed excessive power and
that Congress violated the separation of powers principle by placing the
Commission in the Judicial Branch, requiring federal judges to sit on the
Commission, and authorizing the President to appoint Commission
members."' Reasoning that Congress had the constitutional authority to
delegate an expert body in the Judicial Branch to formulate sentencing
guidelines commiserate with statutorily defined objectives, the Court
rejected Minstretta's contentions and upheld the guidelines'
constitutionality and validity.2"
15. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1983). The Senate determined that the
indeterminate sentencing system has two unjustified and shameful consequences. The first is a great
variation among sentences imposed by differentjudges upon similarly situated offenders. The second
is uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in prison. Each is a serious impediment to
an evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal justice system. Id. at 38-65.
16. U.S.S.G., Table of Contents.
17. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
18. Minstretta, 488 U.S. at 383.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 412. Specifically, the Court stated:
We conblude that in creating the Sentencing Commission - an unusual hybrid in
structure and authority - Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset
the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches. The
Constitution's structural protections do not prohibit Congress from delegating to an expert
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Such drastic sentencing reform centered around fundamental
assumptions concerning the purposes of the criminal justice system.
Congress considered the old "rehabilitational" model outdated and
determined it inadequate to handle society's needs.2 The guidelines
propose that the ultimate aim of the law, and punishment in particular, is
the control of crime.22 Beyond this point, the Guidelines Commission
adopted a view that fused two different notions concerning the aims of
the criminal justice system: (1) the appropriate punishment system should
be defined primarily on the basis of the principle of "just deserts," where
punishment should be scaled to the offender's culpability and the
resulting harms; and (2) punishment should be imposed primarily on the
basis of practical "crime control" considerations, imposing sentences
which most effectively lessen the likelihood of future crime, either by
deterring others or incapacitating the defendant.23
B. The Fine as a Criminal Sanction
The justifications for the use of fines as a criminal deterrent differ
slightly from the aforementioned objectives. Fines are unequivocally
punitive and are designed to deter, which is a significant attraction now
that the treatment and rehabilitational ideals have fallen from grace.24
Congress subscribes to the notion that sentencing decisions should be
designed to ensure that prison resources are, first and foremost, reserved
for those violent and serious criminal offenders who pose the most
dangerous threat to society.25 For nonviolent and less serious offenders,
Congress has determined that the interests of society as a whole, as well
as individual victims of crime, can continue to be served through the
imposition of alternative sentences, such as restitution and community
body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing
guidelines consistent with such significant statutory direction as is present here. Nor does
our system of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the
accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter
uniquely within the ken of judges. Accordingly, we hold the act is constitutional.
Id.
21. The Legislative History of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 stated:
the rehabilitation model is not an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know
too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or
even to determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.
Act of Oct I, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat) 40.
22. Introduction to U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt.A.
23. Id.
24. Rod Morgan & Roger Bowles, Fines: The Case for Review, 1981 CRIM. L. REv. 203, 203-
214.
25. ARTHuR W. CAMPBELL, LAw OF SENTENCING § 3.1 (2d ed. 1991) (citing 18 U.S.C.S. §
3551 ("Sense of the Statute")).
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service.26 The widespread use of fines in the United States has been
attributed to the belief that they serve a dual purpose, deterring criminal
behavior while simultaneously helping to finance the court system."
There are, however, constitutional limitations on the imposition of
fines. These limitations arise chiefly from attempts to assess fines against
indigent offenders who must not be sentenced to longer than maximum
terms because of financial inability to pay the fine, thereby violating their
right to equal protection.28 Finally, as a rule, the courts cannot use
community property to satisfy criminal fines or costs incurred by the co-
owner unless the property itself was connected to the crime.29
While it may appear that Congress believes the Sentencing
Commission will promulgate guidelines which ameliorate the criminal
justice system, section 5E1.2(i)3° has created discord among the courts
and disagreements over its validity and application. Section 5E1.2
imposes fines on individuals as an alternative order of disposition.3
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at § 3.2.
29. Id.
30. Section SEI.2(i) reads:
Notwithstanding of the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, but subject to the
provisions of subsection (f) herein, the court shall impose an additional fine amount that
is at least sufficient to pay the costs to the government of any imprisonment, probation,
or supervised release ordered.
U.S.S.G. § 5E1 .2(i). Subsection (c) of section 5EI .2 articulates the possible maximum and minimum
fines for different offense levels, which vary from $100 to $250,000 unless the statute which the
defendant violated allows for a the imposition of a fine in excess of $250,000. Subsection (f)
provides:
If the defendant establishes that (1) he is not able and, even with the use of a reasonable
installment schedule, is not likely to become able to pay all or part of the fine required
by the preceding provisions, or (2) imposition of a fine would unduly burden the
defendant's dependents, the court may impose a lesser fine or waive the fine. In these
circumstances, the court shall consider alternative sanctions in lieu of all or a portion of
the fine, and must still impose a total combined sanction that is punitive. Although any
additional sanction not proscribed by the guidelines is permissible, community service is
the generally preferable alternative in such instances.
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(f).
31. Section 5EI.2 has been amended and changed since the Guidelines were first introduced
in 1987. Note that in amending the section, the Commission consistently attempts to simplify the
guideline and insure that it is consistent with Congressional statutes.
The 1988 amendments deleted a section that provided for fines not to exceed $250,000 for
commission of a felony or misdemeanor that resulted in the loss of human life; $25,000 for any other
misdemeanor; or $1,000 for an infraction. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(1). U.S.S.G. App. C. n.54 (1988).
The section was replaced by one which placed the applicable fines within the ranges specified in
subsection (c), notwithstanding the fines provided in subsections (f) and (i). Id.
The Commission made these changes in an effort to "make the guideline consistent with 18
U.S.C. § 3571, as amended; to clarify the Commentary; and to correct clerical errors in the guideline
and Commentary." Id. In 1989, section 5E4.1 's commentary captioned "background" was amended
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The section articulates the possible fines and factors for the sentencing
judge to consider when imposing them. Section 5E1.2(i) reads that the
amount of the fine should always be sufficient to ensure that the fine,
taken together with other sanctions, is punitive.32
A "Commentary" section accompanies the guidelines and is designed
to assist judges in interpreting the various sections.33 The particular
by deleting "See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-96." and inserting "see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(b)(3) as amended by Section 7110 Pub. L. No. 100-690 (1988)." This change occurred
because the Commission wanted to replace a reference to legislative history with a citation to a
revised statute. U.S.S.G. App. C. n.279 (1989). This statute, section 7110 of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, confirms the authority of a sentencing court to impose restitution as a condition of
probation. Id. Effective November 1, 1989, section 5E4.2 was renumbered 5EI.2. United States
v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 232 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990). This was done "in an effort to correct a clerical
error." U.S.S.G. App. C. n.302 (1990). In 1990, section 5EI.2(a) was amended with an addition
to the application notes that stated:
Where it is readily ascertainable that the defendant cannot, and is not likely to become
able to, pay a fine greater than the maximum fine set forth in Column B of the Fine Table
in subsection (c)(3), calculation of the alternative maximum fines under subsections
(c)(2)(B) [twice the gross pecuniary loss caused by the offense] and (c)(2)(C) [three times
the gross pecuniary gain to all participants in the offense] is unnecessary .... [T]he
determination of the fine guideline range may be dispensed with entirely upon a court
determination of present and future inability to pay any fine. The inability of a defendant
to post bail bond and the fact that a defendant is represented by assigned counsel are
significant indicators of present inability to pay any fine. In conjunction with other
factors, they may also indicate that the defendant is not likely to become able to pay any
fine.
55 Fed. Reg. 89, 19205 (1990) (to be codified at U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2). Finally, in 1991, the
Commission made an addition to the application notes, asserting that "for most defendants, the
maximum of the guideline fine range from subsection (c) will be at least twice the amount of gain
or loss resulting from the offense." U.S.S.G. App. C. n.384 (1991). The Commission qualified this,
however, by stating that "two times either the amount of gain to the defendant or the amount of loss
caused by the offense exceeds the maximum of the fine guideline, an upward departure from the fine
guideline may be warranted." Id. Furthermore, the Commission stated that if the fine dictated by
the guideline range was insufficient to ensure disgorgement of any gain from the offense and an
adequate punitive fine, then a greater fine may be warranted. Id. This amendment was created to
simplify the operation of this guideline and conserve probation and court resources by eliminating
the need for the determination of loss and gain under this section in most cases. Id. No amendments
were made in 1992.
32. U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(e).
33. In United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1991), the court assessed both the
authority of the "Commentary" which accompanies the guidelines and the method sentencing judges
should use in construing the instructions articulated therein. The court held:
the commentary is entitled to considerable weight, more so than ordinary legislative
history, in interpreting the guidelines .... Because the commentary is printed along-side
the guidelines, if a court ignores the commentary and interprets the guideline in a way
inconsistent with the commentary, and the inconsistency is readily apparent to the
defendant and anyone else who is aware of the decision. In that case, even if the court
explains its reason for ignoring the commentary, the sentence may appear arbitrary or
unfair. Because the commentary cannot be treated as equivalent to the guidelines
themselves but also cannot be treated merely as legislative history .. .the courts shall
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commentary, which supports section 5E1.2(i), articulates that in making
the determination as to the amount of any fine to be imposed under this
provision, the court may be guided by average cost reports published by
the Bureau of Prisons and the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.34 The Commission also publishes a GUIDELINE TRAINER'S
MANUAL 35 to train sentencing judges on the appropriate application of
the guidelines. At present, the cost to the defendant for each month of
incarceration and for each month of supervised release is roughly $1500
and $115.00, respectively.36 The fine provisions of the guidelines are
codified, in part, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553, 3556, 3671-3574 (1993).1
7
(1) consider the guideline and commentary together and (2) construe them so as to be
consistent, if possible, with each other and with the part as a whole. If it is not possible
to construe them consistently, the court should (3) apply the text of the guideline.
Anderson, 942 F.2d at 612-14.
34. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, comment, n.7.
35. This manual instructs the judge:
Guidelines require that a fine be paid in every case except where the defendant establishes
an inability to pay or payment of a fine would place an undue burden on the defendant's
dependents .... For guidance in determining the cost of imprisonment and supervision,
the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts have
provided average monthly costs figures. As of March 1, 1989, the costs are $122 1/month
for imprisonment, $920/month for community confinement, $83.33/month for probation
or supervised release. Calculation of these costs is not possible until the court determines
the length of imprisonment and supervision. Once the costs of imprisonment and
supervision have been determined, the additional fine is added to the fine amount from
the fine range.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINE TRAINER's MANUAL 33 (1989).
36. United States v. Bogan, 788 F. Supp. 433, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1992). See also United States
v. Orena, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21898, *37 (2d Cir. 1994) (listing cost of incarceration at
$1,492.00 per month); United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 28 (Ist Cir. 1993) (listing cost of
incarceration at $1415.56 per month); United States v. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1993)
(listing cost of incarceration at roughly $1500.00 per month).
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3572 provide, in pertinent part:
[(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence include]
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed to (A) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner...
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1993)
[factors to consider in imposing a fine include]
(I) the ability of the defendant to pay the fine in view of the defendant's income, earning
capacity, and financial resources and, if the defendant is an organization, the size of the
organization;
(2) the nature and burden that the payment of the fine will impose on the defendant,
relative to the burden which alternative punishments would impose;
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Even though the guidelines establish sentencing parameters which
judges are instructed to follow, the Commission intended to permit
"sensible flexibility" from the guidelines in appropriate cases.3"
However, a sentencing court may not depart from the guidelines on the
basis of a factor adequately considered by the Sentencing Commission.39
A judge may depart from the close-hewn parameters of the guidelines
when idiosyncratic circumstances warrant individualization of a
sentence.40
Moreover, a district court is statutorily authorized to depart from a
guideline range if it finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately considered by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines.4' The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit requires the district court to do more
than merely list the aggravating circumstances. The sentencing judge
must also specifically find that the aggravating circumstances were not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guideline.42
District courts may not depart upward from the applicable
Sentencing Guideline range without first notifying the parties.4'
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court requires a district court to
provide notice of its intent sua sponte to depart upward from the
applicable guideline range.44 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the textual and contextual evidence of legislative
(3) any restitution or reparation made by the defendant to the victim of the offense, and
any obligation imposed upon the defendant to make such restitution or reparation to the
victim of the offense...
(5) any other pertinent equitable consideration.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3572 (1993).
38. United States v. Laridaw, 733 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (citing United States
v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 1989)).
39. Id. (citing United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1989)).
40. Id. (citing United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 349 (ist Cir. 1989)). In the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the defendant may not appeal a district court's
discretionary refusal to depart downward from an applicable guideline range. United States v.
Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 571 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326, 330 (ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 450 (1991)).
41. United States v. Gray, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15229, *3 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)).
42. Id. at "5.
43. Bums v. United States, 11I S. Ct. 2182, 2183 (1991).
44. Id. at 2184. In reaching its decision, the court noted that several other circuits require the
district courts to provide notice of their intent to depart upward. Id. at 2184 (citing United States
v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Nuno-Para, 877 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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intent indicated Congress, in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act, did
not intend district courts to depart from the guidelines sua sponte without
first affording notice to the parties."
III. Comparison of Courts: Differences Among the Circuit Courts of
Appeal in the Application of § 5E1.2(i)
The idea of ordering criminal defendants to pay the costs of their
incarceration has generated controversy among federal courts.
Specifically, circuit courts demonstrate differing views on how to
properly apply section 5E1.2(i). This part will focus on the differing
views among the federal courts on the following issues: (a) the aims of
the criminal justice system; (b) the standard of review for reviewing
sentences imposed under the guidelines; (c) the use of the accompanying
"Commentary" Section; (d) whether the courts must mandatorily impose
incarceration fines; (e) whether the general purpose of section 5E1.2(i)
is punitive or rehabilitative; (f) the role that a defendant's "ability to pay"
plays in the imposition of the fine; (g) the treatment of indigent
defendants under section 5E1.2(i); (h) who bears the burden of proving
"inability to pay;" (i) the use of the presentence report; and (j) the factors
to be considered in imposing the sentence and the specificity with which
judges must explain their decision making process in imposing the fine.
A. Aims of the Criminal Justice System
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal espouse differing views concerning
the aims of the criminal justice system and the role of fines in achieving
that objective. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has held that the guidelines authorize the assessment of a fine to pay for
victim compensation and restitution."' Additionally, the court added that
the imposition of fines for victim compensation and restitution are a
justified means of effectuating the statutory goal of restitution.47 The
Third Circuit believes that courts should look to achieve restitution in
imposing fines against defendants for "any pecuniary loss inflicted upon
others as a result of the offense.""4 The Third Circuit expresses the
view that fines should serve the criminal justice system's goal of
restitution.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit does not
hold the Third Circuit view that restitution should be made for a
45. Id. at 2186.
46. United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 166 (3d Cir. 1992).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a)(3)).
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
defendant's crime' and not for the costs of imprisonment. The Tenth
Circuit has held that the federal government has a fundamental interest
in appropriately punishing persons, rich and poor, who violate federal
criminal statutes.50 The Tenth Circuit believes the criminal justice
system can serve to punish, deter or spare the taxpayers substantial
expense, and has noted that the fines imposed must be punitive.5' The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reasoned that
criminals impose a dual financial cost upon society - both the price of
their imprisonment and the expense of trying to alleviate some of the
personal cost inflicted upon their victims - and believes that fines serve
a rational purpose in an effective criminal justice system. 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
articulated that, of the desiderata advanced by Congress for criminal
sentences - just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation - incarceration directly fosters only the goal of
incapacitation. 3 The Ninth Circuit bases its position on the notion that
rehabilitation is more efficacious outside prisons, which appear to be
breeding grounds for criminality; and, thus fines are a more desirable
form of punishment than incarceration. 4  In specifically discussing
fines, the Ninth Circuit admits that fines would not deter certain crimes
and thus would be inappropriate, especially where the probability of
detection and conviction approaches zero or the cost to the victim
approaches infinity." But where feasible, the Ninth Circuit believes
fines represent a more desirable form of punishment because they avoid
the deadweight loss to society, unlike incarceration where the taxpayers
are saddled with the considerable cost of imprisonment and whatever
productive endeavor the defendant might otherwise undertake is lost. 6
49. Id. at 168.
50. United States v. Doyan, 909 Fl.d 412, 416 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 414-16.
52. United States v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 187 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 108
(1992).
53. United States v. Bogan, 788 F. Supp. 433, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that deterrence can
often be achieved as well by a fine if set at appropriate levels)."
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. in Bogan, the court noted that incarceration did nothing to compensate the victims of
crimes while fines, on the other hand, required criminals to repay society for the harm they inflict
on both their immediate victims and the commonwealth, presently a less costly form of punishment
to society. Id.
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B. Standard of Review
Federal courts have cited differing language to elaborate on the
appropriate standard of review applied in reviewing sentences imposed
under the guidelines."' While all circuit courts review under the clearly
erroneous standard, some circuits apply additional standards to their
review.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reviews sentences imposed under the guidelines for "a reversible
error;""8 and, guideline departures will be reversed only if the
underlying factual finding is clearly erroneous.59 On the other hand, on
an appeal concerning the grouping rules of the Sentencing Guidelines, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit exercised plenary
review over issues of law.6" In that same decision, however, the court
reaffirmed the sentencing judge's restitution order because the "district
court did not abuse its considerable discretion."' Moreover, in
reviewing the assessment of a § 5El .2(i) fine, the First Circuit refused to
overturn the sanction because it did not amount to "plain error." 2
In addition to reviewing the sentence under the clearly erroneous
standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
examined the sentence to ascertain if it was imposed in violation of law
57. Congress has statutorily defined the standard of review for United States Circuit Courts of
Appeal in IS U.S.C. § 3742, which states in pertinent part:
(e) Consideration.-Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine
whether the sentence -
(i) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is unreasonable, having regard for
(A) the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in Chapter 227
of this title; and (B) the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as
stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline
and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of
the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and
shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they
are clearly erroneous, and shall give due deference to the
district court's application of the guidelines to the facts.
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1992).
58. United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
59. United States v. Bums, 893 F.2d 1343, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1990); revd on other grounds,
IIl S. Ct. 2182 (1991).
60. United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 569 (Ist Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 573.
62. United States v. Carrozza, 4 F.2d 70, 84 (1st Cir. 1994).
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as a result of a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines, or if it was
outside of the guideline range and was unreasonable.63  In this
jurisdiction, a defendant may not raise on an appeal [to complain about
fines] a matter not first presented to the trial court absent showing a
mistake so blatant and fundamental as to constitute a miscarriage of
justice.64 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applies all the Fifth Circuit's standards and recognizes that section
3742(e) of Title 18 of the United States Code65 requires courts of appeal
to give due regard to the district courts' credibility determinations, accept
the district courts' findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and
defer to the district courts' application of the guidelines to the facts."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held
that, in conjuncture with the clearly erroneous standard, the court of
appeals shall review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines de novo.67
Joining the Ninth Circuit in this departure, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviews the district court's choice of the
guideline fine range de novo.68 The Tenth Circuit also reviews the
imposition of a fine for abuse of discretion,69 and has even reviewed the
district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines according to a
63. United States v. Fair, 979 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)
(Supp. 1992)) which codifies the appropriate standard of review for sentences imposed under the
guidelines).
64. United States v. Francies, 945 F.2d 851, 852 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Brunson, 915 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1990)).
65. See supra note 56.
66. United States v. Blackman, 950 F.2d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Armond, 920 F.2d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1230 (7th Cir.
1990)).
67. United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658,662 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Robinson,
967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir. 1992)). The Ferrin court further articulated that it reviews the trial
court's findings of fact "unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." Id. (citing United States v. Ramos, 923 F.2d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991)). See also
United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing a district court's factual
findings in the sentencing phase for clear error) (citing United States v. Chapnick, 963 F.2d 224, 226
(9th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Favorito, 5 F.3d 1338, 1340 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing de novo
both the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines and its application of the guidelines).
68. United States v. Washington-Williams, 945 F.2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Doyan,
909 F.2d at 414).
69. Id.
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"due deference" standard.7" Thus, circuit courts of appeal do not apply
an accepted standard of review.
C. Commentary Sections
Circuit courts of appeal also differ in their attitudes on the authority
contained in the "Commentary" sections, which accompany the
guidelines.7 The Commission designed the "Commentary" section to
assist sentencing judges in applying the guidelines. All circuits agree that
when the commentary is consistent with the guideline, then the former
should receive great consideration, supporting the proposition that the
commentary is more of an accurate reflection of Congressional intent than
ordinary legislative history.72 The courts also view the commentary as
essential in correctly and uniformly applying the guidelines because it
reflects the intent of the Sentencing Commission." The courts' analysis
begins with the language of the guideline, which is to be followed, in
absence of express contrary intent, or if it is clear and unambiguous.
Furthermore, when the guideline is unclear in light of other guidelines,
the commentary sheds light on the meaning.74
70. Doyan, 909 F.2d at 414. The Supreme Court has noticed a "potential for legal error
peculiar to the proceedings under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 in the provision that 'an
aggravating or mitigating fact may justify departure from the otherwise applicable guideline range
if that factual circumstance is not adequately reflected in the range chosen by the Commission."'
Bums v. United States, 111 S.CL 2182, 2194 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Souter reasoned that "because such an issue of adequate reflection goes essentially to the
Commission's intentions, it has uniformly, and I believe correctly, been treated as an issue of law
subject to customary appellate review." Id. In analyzing the circuits, Justice Souter noted, "every
circuit except the Fifth has explicitly held... that 'plenary' or 'de novo' review is appropriate..
. . the Fifth Circuit has held that departure will be affirmed when the reasons for departure are
'acceptable."' Id. at n. 6 (citations omitted).
71. The Commentary that accompanies the guideline sections serves (1) to interpret the
guideline or explain how it is applied; (2) to suggest circumstances which, in the view of the
Commission, may warrant departure from the guidelines; and (3) to provide background information,
including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying.promulgation of the
guideline. U.S.S.G. § IBI.7. Failure to follow such commentary would constitute an incorrect
application of the guidelines, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on appeal. Id. See 18
U.S.C. § 3742. The Commentary is to be treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement, and,
as with a policy statement, the Commentary may provide guidance in assessing the reasonableness
of any departure from the guidelines. Id.
72. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v.
Gierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1066 (3d Cir. 1990)).
73. United States v. Smith, 900 F.2d 1442, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1990).
74. Id. In addition to the Third, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the following circuits have adopted
similar views: United States v. DeCicco, 899 F.2d 1531, 1535-37 (7th Cir. 1990) (reading the
introductory commentary, background commentary, and application notes together to ascertain the
intent of commission); United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1989) (commentary
accompanying each section of the guidelines reflects the intent of Commission, and Commission's
instruction of determining how guidelines are to be applied cannot be disregarded). See Anderson,
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held
that the Sentencing Commission's commentary to the guidelines must be
given controlling weight by courts unless the commentary is violative of
the Constitution or federal statute, or plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the guidelines themselves."
However, discord exists among the circuits regarding the proper
treatment of the commentary when it does not coincide, and cannot be
construed with the guidelines.76 In this instance, most circuits believe
the text of the guidelines must prevail."' However, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held the application notes and
commentary in higher esteem, and has applied the application note in lieu
of the guideline when the two are inconsistent.7"
D. Fine is a Mandatory Sanction
Section 5E1.2(i) provides that "notwithstanding the provisions of
subsection (c) of this section... the court shall impose an additional fine
that is at least sufficient to pay [for imprisonment costs]."79 Subsection
(c) articulates the minimum and maximum fine ranges for corresponding
offense levels. Subsection (a) articulates that the court shall impose a
fine in all cases, and subsection (b) reads that, except as provided in
subsection (f) and subsection (i), the fine shall be within the range
specified in (c)."0 Circuit courts espouse differing views over whether
942 F.2d at 613, which cites the aforementioned cases.
75. United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Stinson v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 1913, 1919-1920 (1993)).
76. Anderson, 942 F.2d at 613.
77. Id. See Lombardi, 5 F.3d at 570 (finding that introductory commentary is only background;
the subsections of the guideline control); United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737, 740 n.4 (1 th Cir.)
(stating that commentary does not have force of law, but serves as aid in interpreting guidelines
provision as legal equivalent of policy statement, or as equivalent of legislative history), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 258 (1991); Smith, 900 F.2d at 1446 ("as with statutory interpretations, our analysis must
begin with the language of the guidelines in question. In absence of express contrary intent, we must
follow the clear and unambiguous language of the guidelines"); United States v. Bogas, 920 F.2d
363, 368 (6th Cir. 1990) ("nothing in the manual suggests that the express command of a guideline
section may be countermanded by the commentary"); Brunson, 882 F.2d at 157 (finding that if
interpretation of commentary would conflict with the guideline itself, the guideline prevails); United
States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that application notes are not formally
binding text and text would be followed over note in event of conflict). Finally, it is interesting to
note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the Anderson
decision as stating that the courts are obligated to consider this commentary in construing the
guidelines. Ferrin, 994 F.2d at 663 (citing Anderson, 942 F.2d at 606).
78. See United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir. 1989).
79. U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(i).
80. See U.S.S.G. § 5EL2.
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the court may impose a subsection (i) fine absent ordering a subsection
(c) punitive sanction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit regards the
fine imposed under § 5E1 .2(i) as an additional fine that is instituted only
in conjunction with the punitive fine imposed under § 5E1.2(a).8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has
explicitly held that the "additional fine" under section 5E1.2(i) may not
be imposed unless the court first imposes a punitive fine under section
5E1.2(a)."2 The court found inconsistent the government's policy of
waiving the punitive fine in subsection (c) because of the defendant's
indigency while continuing to levy the cost of imprisonment pursuant to
subsection (i); the court reasoned that, if the defendant is indigent for the
purposes of one fine, he must be indigent for the purposes of the
other.8 3 The Tenth Circuit found that "fundamental semantics dictates
that a subparagraph (i) fine cannot be 'additional' unless it augments
another fine."8 4
Similar reasoning was adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held 'that the plain language of
section 5E1.2 indicates that a cost of incarceration fine should only be
imposed after a punitive fine has been assessed because the fundamental
semantics dictate that a subparagraph (i) fine cannot be "additional"
unless it augments another fine.8 The Fifth Circuit found that the
imposition of a cost of incarceration fine, § 5E1 .2(i), is not proper absent
an initial punitive fine, § 5E1.2(a), and that the imposition of a cost of
recovery fine alone is a misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit critiqued
the view espoused by the Tenth Circuit. The Seventh Circuit has held
that an "additional fine" doubtlessly means that the judge must add two
numbers together, but zero is a number; "there is no semantic
inconsistency in treating section 5E1 .2(i) as a command to add the costs
of incarceration to whatever fine the court imposes under section
5E1.2(c), including a fine of zero, which is authorized by that
subsection." '87 The Seventh Circuit justified this conclusion by stating
that courts ought not read the guidelines in a way that makes the
81. United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 461 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Corral,
964 F.2d 83, 84 (1st Cir. 1992)).
82. United States v. Labat, 915 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 606-607.
84. Labat, 915 F.2d at 607.
85. Fair, 979 F.d at 1042 (citing Labat, 915 F.2d at 607).
86. Id. See also Corral, 964 F.2d at 84.
87. United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 537-38 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 639 (1993).
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Sentencing Commission look foolish. The Seventh Circuit considered it
folly to create a rule under which imposing a fine of. $1 from the table
compels the court to add a fine measured by the costs of incarceration,
while imposing a fine of $0 from the table forbids the court to add a fine
measured by the costs of incarceration.8 The court concluded that this
all or nothing approach would exclude all intermediate fines, for no
apparent reason.89
In resolving this issue, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit looked to the arguments espoused by the First, Fifth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits and adopted the Seventh Circuit's reading of
§ 5El .2.90 The Ninth Circuit found § 5E1.2 is properly read to give the
sentencing court discretion to calculate a total fine amount, based on both
fine provisions, and then to reduce, waive, or stretch out payment of the
fine according to the defendant's ability to pay. 9'
After examining the same cases from the First, Fifth, and Tenth
Circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
concluded the following: "Section 5E1.2(i)'s plain language imposing
costs of imprisonment and supervision as an additional fine amount
supports the holding of the courts in the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits
that such an additional fine may not be imposed unless a fine pursuant to
§ 5E1.2(a) is also imposed." '92 In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh
Circuit neither discussed nor distinguished the opposite position taken by
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits on this issue.
88. Id.
89. Id. Support for this position can clearly be gleaned from the U. S. Sentencing
Commission's Guideline Trainer's Manual, which states that "once the costs of imprisonment and
supervision have been determined, the additional fine amount is added to the fine amount from the
fine range." U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINE TRAINERS MANUAL 33 (1989).
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has articulated:
In developing the appropriate mechanism by which the proper fine in a given case
is calculated, the Commission developed a two - level system: the court must first look
to the fine table to determine the initial range and then complete its calculation by looking
to the cost of imprisonment Indeed, § 5E 1.2(1) makes specific reference to the fine table
and informs the sentencing court that both provisions are applicable. Together, these
calculations comprise the Commission's effort to realize § 3553(a)(2)'s goals.
Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 186 (5th Cir. 1991). See supra note 37.
90. Favorito, 5 F.3d at 1340 (Turner, 998 F.2d at 537-538; Fair, 979 F.2d at 1042; Corral, 964
F.2d at 84; Labat, 915 F.2d at 607). The Favorito court specifically adopted the decision in Turner.
Id. See also Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1034 (citing Favorito with approval for the proposition that the
district court may impose a cost of incarceration fine without separately imposing a punitive fine as
well).
91. Id.
92. United States v. Norman, 3 F.3d 368, 369 (11 th Cir. 1993).
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E. General Purpose of Section 5E. 2(i)
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal hold different views
concerning the general purpose of section 5EI.2(i) and its effectiveness
as an aid to the administration of criminal justice.93 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia found that section 5E1.2(i)
constitutes an undoubtedly heavy burden for each defendant and that this
burden was to be expected given its punitive purpose.94 Justifying this
conclusion, the court looked at the guideline itself which states that the
amount of the fine should always be sufficient to insure that the fine,
taken together with other sanctions imposed, is punitive.95 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also views the fine as an
effective punitive measure.96 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit found restitution to be the norm and stated that judges
who fail to order full restitution must make explicit findings.97 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has gone so far as
to say that authorizing the assessment of a fine to pay for the costs of a
defendant's imprisonment does nothing to deter criminal conduct, to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, or to help
rehabilitate the defendant.9" The Third Circuit concluded that restitution
93. The U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guideline Trainer's Manual articulates that the purpose
of the fine range (§ 5E1.2(c)) shall be:
4. Purposes of the fine range (differs for minimum and maximum):
a. Purpose of the minimum:
(1) at the very least, defendant will not have financially
profited from criminal activity;
(2) in many instances the minimum provides some level of
punishment and deterrence.
b. Purpose of the maximum: to provide the court with sufficient flexibility to impose a
more severe financial punishment when deemed appropriate.
U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINE TRAINERS MANUAL 30 (1989). This section of the
comment, however, deals with the purpose of the fine imposed pursuant to section 5EI.2(i).
Furthermore, the act's legislative history illustrates that Congress intended that the fine levels were
"designed to establish an effective scale for pecuniary punishment and deterrence that will reflect
current economic realities [with] penalties for organizations are set at higher levels than those for
individuals." Act of Oct. 11, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 105-106.
This was established to help materially penalize and deter white collar crime and other crimes
committed for high profit. Id.
94. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907.
95. Id. The court also found that the judge was required, in setting the fine, to consider the
need for the combined sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense (including the harm or loss
to the victim and the gain to the defendant) to promote respect for the law, to provide just
punishment, and to afford adequate deterrence. Id (citing U.S.S.G §§ 5EI.2(e), 5EI.2(d)(1)).
96. See Doyan, 909 F.2d at 415.
97. United States v. Ahmad, 2 F.3d 245, 246 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)).
98. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d at 165.
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and victim compensation were legitimate aims of the criminal system
which section 5E1.2(i) failed to achieve."
Taking a different position, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found the uniform practice of fining criminals on the
basis of their individual terms of imprisonment to be both an indicator of
the actual harm each has inflicted upon society and rational means to
assist the victims of crime collectively.'0° The Fifth Circuit adheres to
the notion that the clearly enunciated purpose of the fine is punitive.' '
This view has also been enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, which has recognized that the district court is
controlled by the guidelines and must impose sentences that punish and
deter.'02
F. Role of Defendant's "Ability To Pay"
Section 5E1.2(i) states that when a defendant cannot reimburse the
government for the costs of incarceration, the court may either waive the
fine or prepare alternative arrangements.0 3 This "ability to pay" issue
questions the effectiveness of section 5E1.2(i) - if a defendant cannot
pay, what is the point of statutorily imposing the cost of confinement?
The federal courts have discussed the issue generally and give
considerable weight to the defendant's ability to pay the fine in imposing
the sanction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has held that the imposition of both fines, punitive and incarceration
costs, is subject to the defendant's ability to pay.' In the Ninth
Circuit, the district court must consider the ability of the defendant to pay
the fine (including the ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his
earning capacity and financial resources.' 5  This circuit has also
established that courts may impose a fine contingent upon the defendant's
ability to pay at either the time of sentencing or release from prison."
The Ninth Circuit also notes that the Sentencing Guidelines distinguish
current ability to pay from future ability to pay, introduce an additional
factor of the burden to dependents, and require consideration of
99. Id. at 165-66.
100. Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 187.
101. United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1991).
102. United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1990).
103. U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(f). See supra note 30.
104. United States v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 232 (9th Cir. 1990).
105. United States v. Seminole, 882 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1989).
106. Bogan, 788 F. Supp. at 437. See also Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1035 (remanding defendants
sentence and holding that, if defendants established future inability to pay fines, the district court
cannot impose a cost of incarceration fine).
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alternatives. ° This jurisdiction believes the court may not simply
waive a fine because of the defendant's present or future inability to pay
or the burden on his or her dependents, but the district court must
consider alternative sanctions to ensure a total combined sanction that is
punitive.'' "  The Ninth Circuit reads the guidelines to prohibit an
upward departure based on a particular defendant's ability to pay a
greater fine." 9
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the issue of when the district
court must determine the defendant's ability to pay the fine. The court
found implicit in § 5E1.2(a)'s command to impose a fine unless the
defendant establishes present and likely future inability to pay is the
requirement that the district court decide whether the defendant has
established these facts before imposing any fine."0  However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has determined that
basing the fine on the defendant's flagrant abuse of the law was not'
appropriate; and, the district court must consider the defendant's ability
to pay, in light of his earning capacity and the burden the fine places on
the defendant."'
G. Indigent Defendants
Section 5E1.2(i) empowers the court to either waive the fine or
impose alternative sanctions if the defendant cannot pay."2 Naturally,
indigent defendants cannot reimburse the government for the costs of
their incarceration. However, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal
cannot agree on whether courts should automatically waive the fine for
indigent defendants. An additional issue, which becomes salient in this
analysis, is whether the court must mandatorily impose the fine. The
language of the guideline itself suggests that a fine must be imposed.
Section 5E1.2(i) states that the court "shall impose an additional fine
amount that is at least sufficient to pay the costs to the government of
any imprisonment.""'3  The use of "shall" connotes that the fine must
be imposed. Yet, subsection (i) shall be employed "notwithstanding the
107. Id.
108. Id. at 438.
109. United States v. Gray, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 15229, at *4 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 994(d); U.S.S.G. § 5HI.10).
110. Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis in original).
I11. Walker, 900 F.2d at 1206. See also United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418 (3d Cir.
1992) (in determining restitution award, court must consider ability to pay and designate recipients
of restitution).
112. See supra note 30.
113. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i) (emphasis supplied).
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provisions of subsection (c) but subject to the provisions of subsection
(f)." 4  Thus, the fine should be imposed notwithstanding the fact that
the court will order a punitive fine against the defendant, but subject to
the defendant's ability to pay." 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognizes
that the guidelines require the court to impose a fine unless the defendant
establishes an inability to pay." 6 The Ninth Circuit also holds that the
guidelines do not permit the substitution of community service for a
fine." 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit finds
the cost-recovery assessment mandatory unless the defendant shows the
court that the assessment should be lowered or waived." 8 The Seventh
Circuit holds that the use of the word "shall" in the statute makes the fine
mandatory." 9 The view espoused by United States Court of Appeals
in the Fourth Circuit takes a milder approach. The Circuit views the
requirement of the incarceration cost fine as expressly made subject to the
court's discretionary authority to reduce or waive. 2
Considerable disagreement exists among the circuit courts over the
threshold issue of whether courts should automatically waive the fine for
indigent defendants. The statute's legislative history suggests that non-
wealthy defendants may still be fined because the law permits installment
payments to ease the burden on the defendant.' Furthermore, the
114. Id. (emphasis supplied).
115. Incidentally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guideline Trainer's Manual does not carry
the same "mandatory" language and states that an additional fine "is to be imposed." U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINE TRAINER'S MANuAL 33 (1989) (emphasis supplied).
116. Rafferty, 911 F.2d at 232.
117. Ferrin, 994 F.2d at 664. This circuit has also read the Guidelines to provide that any
punishment imposed in place of the fine, such as community service, is an alternative sanction that
must be imposed in lieu of all or a portion of a fine; community service cannot be imposed as a fall
back punishment to be served if the defendant cannot later pay the fine. Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1035
(citing U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(f)) (emphasis in original).
118. Francies, 945 F.2d at 852. The Tenth Circuit takes an equally stringent approach. See
Doyan, 909 F.2d at 414 (stating that sections 5E1.2(e) and 5EI.2(i) together mandate a punitive fine
that is at least sufficient to cover the costs of the defendant's incarceration and supervision, subject
to the provisions of section 5EI.2(f)).
119. Ahmad, 2 F.3d at 248 (citing Ferrin, 994 F.2d at 665-66).
120. United States v. Gresham, 964 F.2d 1426, 1427 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992). See also United States
v. Gates, 777 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding the guidelines clearly state that the court
"shall" impose an additional fine amount comprising the costs of imprisonment and supervised
release, and federal statutes make it clear that it is within the court's discretion to impose on the
defendant the costs of prosecution and to direct the defendant to pay his court-appointed attorney's
fees where the court finds that defendant has become financially able to do so) (emphasis in original)
(citing U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(i); 28 U.S.C. § 1918(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c), ()).
121. Act of Oct. 11, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 108. Congress
considered, in setting the fine levels, that:
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language of the guideline itself, in stating that the court "may" waive the
fine, does not insinuate that the court "must" waive the fine for indigent
defendants.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held
that a district court may not impose a duty to pay for the costs of
incarceration or supervised release if the defendant is indigent for
purposes of a fine under the Sentencing Guidelines section 5E1.2(a).
122
This refusal to fine indigent defendants encompasses both the punitive
fine under § 5E1.2(a) and the incarceration fine under § 5E1.2(i).'23
The First Circuit does not, however, apply the same requirements to
restitution. While the court may not impose a § 5E1.2(i) fine on indigent
defendants, the First Circuit has refused to extend the same prohibition
to restitution orders. 24 The First Circuit reasoned that "the district
court's determination of indigency under U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) is
independent of and does not affect its ruling on restitution ... in the case
of restitution, a separate statutory scheme has been established which
includes its own independent consideration of defendant's ability to
pay." 1 2 5  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
has also followed this position. The Eleventh Circuit forbids district
court's to impose the costs of incarceration or supervised release if the
defendant is indigent for purposes of a fine under § 5E1.2(a).'26
The Tenth Circuit takes a completely different position from the
First Circuit, concluding the statute mandated only consideration of
indigency in framing a restitution award,' 27 and establishing that
While it is not intended that a fine for a solvent individual be so high as to force him into
a lifetime of poverty, if a defendant is wealthy and the court finds that a high fine is
necessary to serve the purposes of sentencing, it should not be reluctant to sentence the
defendant to pay a high fine. On the other hand, the court need not avoid the use of a
sentence to pay a fine against an individual who is not wealthy since the bill would permit
installment payments of a fine. In some cases, the most appropriate sentence might be,
for example, the payment of a fairly substantial fine in installments of a specified amount
out of each pay check over a period of time.
Id.
122. Corral, 964 F.2d at 84. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that if a defendant
cannot pay a punitive fine, there is no basis for expecting that he will be able to pay for the expense
of supervised release; thus imposition of the sanction would be meaningless and result in unnecessary
record keeping. Id. See also United States v. Landaw, 733 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
(not imposing a fine because defendant cannot, and will not likely be able to, pay the fine for the
costs of imprisonment).
123. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 461.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664).
126. Norman, 3 F.3d at 369 (citing Corral, 964 F.2d at 84 and noting Corral's reliance on
Labat).
127. -Doyan, 909 F.2d at 415 (citing United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1546 (10th Cir.
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indigency is not a bar to either restitution or a separate fine levied to
repay the government for the costs of incarcerating the defendant. 2 '
In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that section 5E1.2(f)
requires the court to consider alternative sanctions and gives the court the
option to reduce or waive the fine in light of the defendant's financial
hardship.'29 The court also found sentencing judges obliged to consider
the defendant's financial status and possible alternative sanctions;
however, it found the guidelines devoid of an obligation on the part of
the sentencing judge to tailor the fine to the defendant's ability to
pay. 130
This view is also adopted by the Seventh Circuit which does not
permit a defendant's inability to pay to justify a lower fine or the use of
installments.' 3' The Seventh Circuit similarly reasons that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(a) does not require the district court to find that the defendant can
pay, but rather only requires that the judge consider a defendant's ability
to pay.'
32
In line with the Seventh Circuit's position, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has determined that, at the time
restitution is ordered, a defendant's indigency does not bar the
requirement of restitution. 3  The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit holds an analogous view, believing that financial
obligations may be imposed upon a defendant who is indigent at the time
of sentencing but subsequently acquires the means to discharge the
obligations. 34 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has noted that district courts may "impose a fine upon even
an indigent defendant if it finds that the defendant has sufficient earning
capacity to pay the fine following his release from prison.' 35
H. Burden of Proof
The court must find that the defendant cannot pay the fine before
electing to waive the sanction. Circuit courts hold two distinct views on
1987)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 414 (emphasis in original).
130. Id. at415. The Doyan court rejected defendant's argument that judicial discretion is limited
by the requirement that a court impose a fine based on the defendant's ability to pay. Id. See also
Gresham, 964 F.2d at 1429 n.6.
131. Ahmad, 2 F.3d at 247.
132. Id. at 246.
133. Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 185-86 (citing United States v. Ryan, 874 F.2d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.
1989)).
134. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1089 (1984).
135. Favorito, 5 F.3d at 1339 (citing Seminole, 882 F.2d at 443).
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this issue. Some courts support the proposition that once the defendant
raises the issue and contends that the fine cannot be paid, the burden then
shifts to the government to prove otherwise. Other courts hold the view
that the fine to cover the costs of imprisonment is mandatory and must
be imposed unless the defendant satisfies the burden of proving that he
cannot reimburse the government. The guideline reads "the court shall
impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he
is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay."'36  Such
language suggests the burden lies on the defendant to prove that the court
should not impose the sanction.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, when
interpreting the guidelines, the presumption is that a fine will be imposed,
and the burden is on the defendant to show that a fine is not
warranted.'" This view is shared by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, which distributes to the defendant the
burden of establishing an inability to pay the fine.'
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits
believe that, while it is true that the district court must consider various
factors including the ability to pay and the affect of a fine on dependents,
it is equally true that the burden is on the defendant to present evidence
concerning these factors to the extent they are not adequately or
accurately addressed.' 39
The Fifth Circuit finds it undisputed, in reading section 5E1.2 in its
entirety, that the guidelines place the burden of proving an inability to
pay a fine squarely on the defendant, and, if the defendant makes such
a showing, the court may impose a lesser fine or waive the fine
altogether. 40 This Circuit has also articulated that, while the district
court must consider certain factors in determining the appropriate fine,
the guidelines have placed the burden on the defendant to present
evidence of these factors.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relies on
section 5E1.2(f) '4 in determining that the guidelines place the burden
on the defendant to prove he is unable to pay a fine and holds that the
guidelines require the court to impose a fine unless the defendant
136. U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(a) (emphasis supplied).
137. Lombardi, 5 F.3d at 572 (citing United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1993)).
138. United States v. Orena, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21898, *36 (2d Cir. 1994).
139. Washington-Williams, 945 F.2d at 327 (citing United States v. Bradley, 922 F.2d 1290,
1298 (6th Cir. 1991)).
140. Fair, 979 F.2d at 1041 (citing Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 185).
141. See supra note 30.
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establishes an inability to pay."' In this Circuit, the defendant must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is unlikely to
become able to pay the fine in the future.'4 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however,
refuses to accept the government's argument that a defendant has the
burden of showing an inability to pay the fine when a plethora of




In determining a defendant's ability to pay the fine, courts often
utilize the information contained in the presentence report. Among the
circuits, however, courts are not consistent in their application of the
presentence report, with some courts relying more heavily than others on
the information it provides. This issue directly relates to the question of
who bears the burden of proving an inability to pay a fine because
defendants often rely on the presentence report to automatically establish
their inability to comply with the sanction.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in examining Rule 32 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, concluded that the rule
contemplated full adversary testing of the issues relevant to the
guideline's sentence and mandates that parties be given "an opportunity
to comment upon the probation officer's determination and on other
matters relating to the appropriate sentence."'4
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, if the
presentence report makes no recommendation concerning the fine and the
defendant neither presents evidence on nor objects to the amount of the
fine assessed within the guideline range, the defendant may not raise new
objections on appeal absent plain error. 146 Yet, the same circuit decided
the issue differently on a separate occasion, repealing the section 5E1 .2(i)
sanction because the trial judge made no findings that supported his
142. Rafferty, 911 F.2d at 232.
143. Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1035. Robinson interpreted the sentencing judge's statement that
appellant's had not clearly established their inability to pay fines to mean the district court may have
applied a "clear and convincing" standard of proof. This court concluded the appropriate standard
in this case would be "preponderance of the evidence." Id at 1033 (citing United States v. Navarro,
979 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1992)).
144. Labat, 915 F.2d at 606.
145. Burns, 111 S. Ct. at 2186 (citing FED. I. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1)). See supra footnotes 43 & 44
and accompanying text.
146. Matovsky, 935 F.2d at 722 (citing United States v. Smith, 919 F.2d 123, 124 (10th Cir.
1990)).
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departure from the recommendations of the presentence report, pointed
to no evidence that differed from the facts contained in the presentence
report, and failed to discuss any other evidence concerning the
defendant's financial condition. 147  A conflict arose between the two
decisions because one sentencing judge imposed the sanction after
adopting the presentence report, which did not recommend imposing a
fine, and another judge adopted the presentence report, which was also
absent a recommendation for a fine. From the decisions, the circuit
finally distilled the rule that specific findings are necessary when the
court adopts the presentence report's findings, but then departs from the
presentence report's recommendation on fines or cost of
incarceration. 
141
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit takes the
straightforward approach and freely empowers the district court to reach
a different conclusion than enunciated in the presentence report.'
49
Alternatively, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
relies on facts contained in the presentence report as an important factor
in determining a defendant's inability to pay fines. 5 Finally, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit allows the
presentence report to establish the defendant's burden of proving his
inability to pay. 5' If the presentence report clearly indicates the
defendant's financial incapacity to pay the fine, the burden then shifts to
the government to prove otherwise by furnishing evidence to the
contrary.1
52
J Factors to Consider in Imposing the Sanction
Section 5El .2(d) articulates various factors that the sentencing judge
should consider in imposing the sanction.' Congress intended
147. United States v. Pattan, 931 F.2d 1035, 1044 (Sth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2308
(1992).
148. Fair, 979 F.2d at 1041.
149. United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1991).
150. Robinson, 20 F.2d at 1033 (citing United States v. Schubert, 957 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.
1992)).
151. Labat, 915 F.2d at 606.
152. Id.
153. Section 5EI.2(d) states:
in determining the amount of the fine, the court shall consider:
(1) the need for the combined sentenced to reflect the seriousness of the offense
(including the harm or loss to the victim and the gain to the defendant), to promote
respect for the law, to provide just punishment, and to afford adequate deterrence;
(2) any evidence presented as to the defendant's ability to pay the fine (including the
ability to pay over a period of time) in light of his earning capacity and financial
resources;
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sentencing judges to consider these and all other relevant factors relating
to the defendant before imposing the fine, and such sanctions should only
be imposed after thorough consideration.'54 The guideline itself sends
conflicting signals on the issue. The language states that courts "shall
consider" the articulated factors. 5 ' "Shall" carries mandatory
implications that courts "must" consider the specified factors, yet the use
(3) the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his dependents relative to
alternative punishments;
(4) any restitution or reparation that the defendant has made or is obligated to make;
(5) any collateral consequences of conviction, including civil obligations arising from the
defendant's conduct;
(6) whether the defendant previously has been fined for a similar offense; and
(7) any other pertinent equitable considerations.
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d). In the application notes and commentary which follow this section, the
Commission states:
3. The determination of the fine guideline range may be dispensed with entirely upon a
court determination of present and future inability to pay any fine. The inability of a
defendant to post bail bond (having otherwise been determined eligible for release) and
the fact that a defendant is represented by (or was determined eligible for) assigned
counsel are significant indicators of present inability to pay any fine. In conjunction with
other factors, they may also indicate that the defendant is not likely to become able to pay
any fine.
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2, comment, n.3. See supra note 37, listing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3572 (1993), which
essentially codify this guideline.
154. The legislative history of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 illustrates this
Congressional intent:
As in the case with regard to other potential sanctions, the court is required to consider
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the purposes of sentencing with regard to which a fine may be an appropriate
response, and the guidelines and any policy statements which may be applicable. Use of
the qualifier "to the extent that they are applicable," in referring to the four stated
purposes of sentencing is intended as recognition that a fine may often be a highly useful
means of providing just punishment and of deterring others from engaging in like offenses
- particularly offenses affording the opportunity for monetary gain - while the other
purposes of sentencing would less commonly be served by a sentence to pay a fine.
In considering the characteristics of the defendant, the court is specifically required
to consider the ability of the defendant to pay a fine in the amount and the manner
contemplated in view of the defendant's income, earning capacity, and financial resources,
and, if the defendant is an organization, the size of the organization. The court is also
required to consider the burden the fine will place on the defendant and on his
dependents, any payment of restitution by the defendant or any requirement that the
defendant make reparation to the victim, the impact of the fine on the future financial
stability of the defendant, any effort by an organizational offender to discipline the
persons responsible for the offense or ensure against recurrence of the offense, and any
other equitable considerations that are pertinent.
Act of Oct. 11, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 107-108. Finally, the
Commission has generally suggested that sentencing judges consider: "(a) purposes of sentencing;
(b) ability to make payment and burden on defendant's dependents; (c) restitution obligations;
(d) collateral consequences, (e) prior similar fines; and (1) any other pertinent equitable
considerations." U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINE TRAINERS MANUAL 33 (1989).
155. See supra note 152.
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of "consider"' 56 does not necessarily imply that courts must utilize all
articulated components.'
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeal do not agree that
sentencing judges are required to completely utilize these considerations
in imposing their sentences and employing sanctions. Specifically, courts
hold different views on whether the sentencing judge must consider all
the listed factors and specifically list the considerations made in
determining the sanction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit holds that the guidelines set forth no requirement that the
sentencing court make express findings in setting the amount of the fine;
and, the Circuit declined to create such a rule. 5 ' In this circuit, so long
as the sentencing judge considers the ability to pay, the judge is in
156. "Consider" means "to fix the mind on, with a view to careful examination; to examine; to
inspect; to deliberate about and ponder over; to entertain or give heed to." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 306 (6th ed. 1990). This word does not carry "mandatory" implications.
157. Defendant's fine must be paid immediately, unless the district court provides for payment
on a certain date or in installments. Gresham, 964 F.2d at 1429. In establishing a defendant's ability
to pay courts have considered the defendant's representation by assigned counsel as a significant
indicator of present inability to pay. Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1033 (defining "eaming capacity" as
"education, experience, job skills, or a combination thereof"). Courts have also noted future earning
capacity after incarceration. See Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907 (finding that even though defendants
were without substantial assets or gainful employment and'unable to pay fines immediately, because
each defendant was a healthy young woman with a high school diploma; additional vocational
education; experience in the areas of carpentry, electronics, and waitressing; and had supportive
families, courts may impose fine); Matovsky, 935 F.2d at 723 (holding that defendant with substantial
education and no dependents who will be employable after prison term has ability to pay fine);
Blackman, 950 F.2d at 425 (concluding that defendant demonstrated capacity to earn wages and pay
fine by operating his own used car business after prison term during period of supervised release);
United States v. Ruth, 946 F.2d 110, 114 (10th Cir. 1991) (determining that defendant's ability as
a "wizard" auto mechanic supplies evidence to support contention defendant's considerable earning
potential for purposes of paying court imposed fine), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1189 (1992); Walker,
900 F.2d at 1207 (finding that defendant, with a high school education and little job experience, does
not have future earning capacity after twenty years of confinement to pay fine).
Additionally, in calculating the fine, courts may freeze defendant's assets to pay sanctions and
consider hidden or unexplained assets. See U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2, comment, n.6 (finding failure to
disclose assets may justify the imposition of a larger fine); Hopper, 941 F.2d at 423 (holding court
may use defendant's equity in home with his wife as an asset in calculating appropriate fine);
Gresham, 964 F.2d at 1430 (stating that defendant's interest as a tenant by entirety is a financial
resource that the court may properly consider under section 3572(a)(1) because it is presently a
vested interest with value to him, and that a legally imposed fine that is due immediately is not
rendered illegal merely because it is not collectible immediately); United States v. Hays, 899 F.2d
515 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that a narcotic's defendant's unexplained assets were appropriately
considered in setting fine), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990); Gates, 777 F. Supp. at 1295 (in
freezing defendant's assets, court was merely assuring assets available at the time of conviction
would remain so until sentencing so court could properly assess costs and fines under sentencing
guidelines and applicable statutes).
158. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 906.
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compliance with the guidelines' mandates. 59 "Thus, when the record
demonstrates that the judge considered [the] factor before imposing the
fine, the appellate court will not reverse the fine merely because the
district court did not make an express finding was made."'
' 60
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
adopts a similar view to the District of Columbia Circuit that the
guidelines do not create an obligation for the sentencing judge to tailor
the fine to the defendant's ability to pay. 6'
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reads 18
U.S.C. § 3664(a) to merely require the court to consider financial
conditions, among other factors; and, the Circuit noted that there was no
requirement that the defendant be found able to pay at the present
time. 62 This Circuit has also held that the district court, in imposing
an order of restitution, must consider not only the amount of the victim's
loss, but also the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs
and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and
such other factors as the court deems appropriate.
63
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined
that conspicuously absent from subsection 5E1.2(i) is any reference to
subsection (d) which requires the court to consider the burden that a
punitive fine might impose upon the defendant and his dependents.'
64
Noting that the sentencing guidelines do not place a similar requirement
on a subsection (i) fine, the circuit has determined that a defendant's
observation of the resulting harshness is a matter more appropriately
addressed by Congress or the Sentencing Commission. 65  This circuit
has rejected a defendant's arguments that the district court failed to
consider or to articulate findings regarding the guideline factors when
assessing a fine, particularly an ability to pay.'" The court held that
the district court need not make specific findings on the record that
demonstrate these factors were considered before the fine was imposed
because the guidelines set forth no such requirement. 61 The Fifth
Circuit has rejected a defendant's objection to the sanction on the grounds
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Gresham, 964 F.2d at 1430 at n.6 (citing Doyan, 909 F.2d at 415).
162. Lombardi, 5 F.3d at 573 (citing Ahmad, 2 F.3d at 245).
163. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 461 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a); Savoie, 985 F.2d at 618) (emphasis
supplied).
164. Francies, 945 F.2d at 852. See supra notes 30, 152.
165. Id.
166. Matovsky, 935 F.2d at 722.
167. Id. (citing Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 906).
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that the record did not reflect that the court had considered the relevant
factors or the defendant's ability to pay the fine, stating that one's ability
to pay the fine is not the only criteria prescribed by section 3553(a) for
determining the amount of the fine.""s In this particular case, the
circuit court noted that the court may factor other considerations into
imposing the sanction, such as the need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, the need to provide just punishment for the offense, the need to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and the kinds of sentences
available. 69 Finally, the Fifth Circuit rejects the argument that, because
of the mandatory language of section 5E 1.2(d), courts must make specific
findings showing they properly considered the pertinent factors in
determining the fine amount. The court notes that no statutory or
sentencing guideline intimates that such detailed findings are necessary
exists."'70
Taking a different position, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has vacated and remanded a fine where the district court
failed, as far as the appellate court could determine, to consider the
factors, such as defendant's income, his ability to pay, and the effect the
fine might have on dependents, required by 18 U.S.C. § 3572 and
U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(dX3). 7' Extending the Sixth Circuit's view, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rigidly reads 18
U.S.C. §§ 3771, 3572 to require the sentencing judge to consider a
number of specified factors before imposing a fine. 72 Taking an
equally stringent position, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit finds the language of section 5E1.2(d) mandatory, holding
that "the court shall consider" implies the sentencing court must make
specific findings on the record that demonstrate these factors were
considered before a fine may be imposed.'73
The Eighth Circuit merely adopted the position taken by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which reads the guidelines
168. Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 185. See supra note 37.
169. Id.
170. Fair, 979 F.2d at 1040. See supra note 152. It must be noted that one case in this circuit
has declined to adopt the aforementioned positions. In Patton, the Court of Appeals found the
sentencing court erred in imposing the fine and not explaining its decision to depart from the
presentencing report's recommendation that the fine would impose hardship on the defendant's
family. See Patton, 931 F.2d at 1044.
171. Hopper, 941 F.2d at 423.
172. United Statesv. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1369(7th Cir. 1991),cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2019
(1991). See supra note 37.
173. Walker, 900 F.2d at 1206. The Walker court also recognized, however, that the guidelines
also control the district court by directing that the sentence imposed should punish and deter. Id.
(citing U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(d)(1)).
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to specifically require the district court to consider the ability of the
defendant to pay the fine (including ability to pay over a period of time)
in light of his earning capacity and financial resources.'74 Thus, the
Eighth Circuit reads § 5E1.2(d)(2) as containing an implicit requirement
commanding the district court to consider any evidence presented as to
the defendant's ability to pay the fine in determining the amount of the
fine. '75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit espouses
completely different views on the issue. Rather than requiring express
findings, this circuit holds that satisfactory compliance with 5E1 .2 merely
requires that the record reflect the district court's consideration of the
pertinent factors prior to imposing the fine.'76 Moreover, the circuit
court notes that the guideline merely requires the court to consider
alternative sanctions and gives the court the option to reduce or waive the
fine in light of the defendant's financial hardship.'" The Tenth Circuit
recognizes the court's obligation to consider the defendant's financial
status and possible alternative sanctions, but fails to read the guidelines
as imposing an obligation to tailor the fine to the defendant's ability to
pay.
178
Projecting a different view from the Tenth Circuit, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit remanded a district court
sentence which imposed a fine without- an explicit discussion of 5E1.2
factors that might justify the fine.'
79
IV. Evaluation of Circuit Courts of Appeal's Application of § 5E1.2(i)
In enacting the Sentencing Guidelines, Congress intended for
sentencing legislation to contain a comprehensive and consistent statement
of the federal law of sentencing setting forth the sentencing system and
a clear statement of the kinds and lengths of sentences available for
federal offenders.' Given the different positions held by the courts on
the aforementioned issues, has Congress achieved its desired purpose?
174. Seminole, 882 F.2d at 443 (citing U.S.S.G. § SEI.2(d)(2)).
175. Robinson, 20 F.3d at 1034 (emphasis supplied).
176. Washington- Williams, 945 F.2d at 328.
177. Doyan, 909 F.2d at 414 (emphasis in original).
178. Id. at 415. See also United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating
that a court must make specific findings concerning defendant's ability to pay); United States v.
Demes, 941 F.2d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing a district court decision because district court
failed to make finding as to defendant's ability to pay), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 399 (1991); United
States v. Nez, 945 F.2d 341, 343 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding no plain error in sentencing court's failure
to make explicit findings to support imposition of fines).
179. See United States v. Paskett, 950 F.2d 705, 709 (11th Cir. 1992).
180. Act of Oct. 11, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 39.
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While courts may disagree in their application and interpretation of the
guidelines, the guidelines still control the unfettered discretion of
sentencing judges by offering, at the very least, a consistent set of
parameters that courts must follow in formulating sentences. The
inconsistencies among the federal court's interpretations of the guidelines
illustrated in this Comment do not serve to indict the ability of the
Sentencing Guidelines to provide an effective system with which to
adjudicate criminal justice. They merely call attention to the
discrepancies among circuit courts in interpreting the guidelines.
From the evidence presented by courts in their different applications
of the guidelines, the following conclusions should be drawn. The
criminal justice system should aim to deter criminal conduct. Restitution
to victims presents one objective of the system, but efforts should focus
on deterrence and prevention. Furthermore, courts should not impose
restitutionary fines to compensate victims without imposing fines to
recuperate the costs of incarceration. Finally, the criminal justice system
should serve to punish, deter, and spare the taxpayers substantial
expense. "
Congress admits that the rehabilitational model is inappropriate and
ineffective.8 2  Because criminals impose a dual financial cost on
society - both the price of their imprisonment and the expense of
compensating victims - fines effectively address both of these
problems.8 3 Furthermore, fines present a more desirable form of
punishment because they avoid the deadweight loss to society of
incarceration where the taxpayers are saddled with the considerable cost
of keeping the defendant behind bars.8 4 Fines imposed on criminals
should aim to serve as punitive sanctions which deter criminal conduct.
A close reading of section 5E1.2 should easily mollify the different
views among courts in interpreting the guideline. The statute states that
the court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant
establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to
pay any fine.' From this language, courts can conclude the use of
"shall" implies that the fine must be imposed in all cases. As used in
statutes, contracts, or the like, "shall" is generally imperative or
mandatory.8 6  The word in ordinary usage means "must" and is
181. United States v. Doyan, 909 F.2d 412, 414-16 (10th Cir. 1990).
182. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
183. United States v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 187 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108
(1992).
184. United States v. Bogan, 788 F.2d 433, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
185. U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(a).
186. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990).
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inconsistent with the concept of discretion." 7 Thus, if the guideline
articulates that the court shall impose an additional fine amount that is at
least sufficient to cover the costs to the government of any
imprisonment,'88 then that fine must mandatorily be imposed. The only
limitations on the imposition of the fine occur when the defendant
establishes an inability to pay the fine. The language in section 5E1.2(a),
"where the defendant establishes she is unable to pay the fine," clearly
suggests the defendant bears the burden of proving an inability to pay.
Moreover, the commission gives the court the option of waiving the fine
in section 5E1.2(f),9 rather than requiring them to do so.
The use of "consider" diminishes the mandatory connotation of
"shall" in section 5E1.2(d). The use of consider implies the courts may
use discretion with regard to the factors articulated by the Commission
in imposing the fine.'" Furthermore, the guidelines do not contain any
provision which suggests that courts must specifically articulate their
findings in imposing the sanction. Courts must consider ability to pay,
but need not articulate express findings. Finally, nothing in section
5E 1.2(i) indicates that before ordering the defendant to pay the costs of
imprisonment, the court must take into account the factors articulated in
subsection (d). 9' Not only should the fine be imposed
"notwithstanding" the imposition of the punitive fine in subsection (c),
but the only limitation placed on the incarceration fine can be found in
subsection (f) which provides the court with the option of waiving the
fine in the event the defendant cannot pay.'92
V. Constitutionality
While circuit courts have disagreed over various issues concerning
the application and interpretation of section 5E1.2(i), no issue has
engendered more controversy among the circuits than the constitutionality
of 5E 1.2(i). In confronting constitutional challenges by defendants, three
circuits have upheld the constitutionality and validity of section 5E1 .2(i)
while only one, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
has declared 5E1.2(i) unconstitutional.
187. Id.
188. U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(i).
189. Doyan, 909 F.2d at 414. See supra note 30.
190. See supra note 152.
191. United States v. Francies, 945 F.2d 851, 852 (5th Cir. 1991).
192. See supra note 30.
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In United States v. Doyan,"3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that requiring
those convicted and sentenced to pay the costs of their incarceration
violates equal protection principles. 94  Specifically, the defendant
argued that requiring convicts to pay the costs of confinement amounts
to an irrational and arbitrary classification, impermissibly burdening a
narrow group of citizens. 95
The court began its analysis by noting that a strong presumption of
constitutionality attends a law which has been produced by the solemn
prerequisites of Congressional enactment and Presidential approval. 96
Noting that where a federal statute neither abridges a fundamental right,
nor imposes a "suspect classification," the court applied a rational basis
test to determine whether the statute has a "rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest.' 97  The Tenth Circuit found that
rational basis scrutiny was appropriate because the constitutional claim
neither implicated a convicted felon's fundamental constitutional right,
namely to have the costs of their imprisonment paid by the taxpayer, nor
applied to felons in a discriminatory way.' Concluding that section
5EI.2(i) bore some rational relationship to the legitimate, fundamental
interest the government has in appropriately punishing persons - rich
and poor - who violate its criminal laws, the Tenth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of section 5E1.2(i).' 99
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also refused
to invalidate section 5E1.2(i). In United States v. Hagmann,"° the
Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's arguments that section 5E1.2(i) is
contrary to the Sentencing Reform Act's mandate that the guidelines be
consistent with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C.
193. 909 F.2d 412 (10th Cir. 1990).
194. Id. at 416. The court infered from defendant's brief that he sought to invoke the equal
protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, where, if the federal
government classifies individuals in a way which would violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it would be held to contravene the Due Process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 415 n.2 (citations omitted).
195. Id. at 415.
196. Id. at 416 (citations omitted).
197. United States v. Doyan, 909 F.2d 412, 416 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Vanacter v. Village of
South Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1989)).
198. Id.
199. Id. Specifically, the court held "whether the purpose of the fine is to punish, deter, or to
spare the taxpayers a substantial expense that has been generated by an intentional criminal act, we
cannot say that Guideline § 5EI.2(i) as applied bears no rational relation to the legitimate
governmental interest in criminal justice." Id.
200. 950 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108 (1992).
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§ 3553(a)(2)2"' because the additional "incarceration-costs" fine under
section 5E1.2(i) imposed a punishment that is greater than necessary to
satisfy the goals set forth in that statute.2 °2  The' defendant also
contended that section 5El .2(i) is irrational and amounts to a deprivation
of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 3
In response to defendant's argument that the additional fine imposed
with the punitive fine constitutes excessive punishment, the court held
that while section 5E1.2(b)2 °4 makes specific reference to the fine table
[§ 5E1.2(c)] and informs the sentencing court that both provisions are
applicable, together, these calculations comprise the Commission's efforts
to realize § 3553(a)(2)'s goals.20 ' Rejecting the defendant's
constitutional claims, the Hagmann court noted due process requires that
information must have some minimal indicium of reliability and bear
some rational relationship to the decision to impose a particular
sentence. °6 Because criminals' terms of imprisonment generally reflect
the seriousness of their crimes and the harm inflicted, the court found that
the uniform practice of fining criminals on the basis of their
individualistic terms of imprisonment provides a rational means to assist
the victims of crime collectively.0 7
201. See supra note 37.
202. United States v. Hagmann, 950 F.2d 175, 186 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 108
(1992).
203. Id. In support of this contention, Defendant also argued that monies collected under
§ 5E 1.2(i) were actually expended on unrelated functions. Id. The court noted that monies collected
were deposited into a victim's fund in the United States Treasury, but stated:
the fact that the monies collected on the basis of the costs of imprisoning a given
defendant are expended to generally benefit the victims of crime and realize the goals of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) snuffs another argument: § 5EI.2(i) is not premised on the
legislative intent of having a criminal pay part or all of the cost of his or her own
confinement.
Id. at 187 n.29.
204. Section 5EI.2(b) provides that:
Except as provided in subsections (f) and (i) below, or otherwise required by statute, the
fine imposed shall be within the range specified in subsection (c) below. If, however, the
guideline for the offense in Chapter Two provides a specific rule for imposing a fine, that
rule takes precedence over subsection (c) of this section.
U.S.S.G. § 5EI.2(b). See supra note 30.
205. Hagmann, 950 F.2d at 186.
206. Id. at 187 (citing United States v. Angulo, 927 F.2d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 1991), affd 979
F.2d 210 (1992)).
207. Id. at 187. Specifically, the Hagmann court determined "once convicted, criminals impose
a dual financial cost upon society - both the price of their imprisonment and the expense of trying
to alleviate some of the personal cost inflicted upon their victims." Id. Thus, criminal's terms of
imprisonment reflect the serious of both their offense and the harm they have inflicted upon society.
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The greatest example of discord among the circuit courts flows from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has taken
a unique position among the circuits and proclaimed section 5E1.2(i)
unconstitutional. In United States v. Spiropoulos, °8 the Third Circuit
declared imposing a fine based in part on the cost of the defendant's
imprisonment inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3572 and violative of
due process. Consequently, sentencing judges in the Third Circuit's
district courts do not have the authority under section 5E1.2(i) to impose
a sanction to cover the costs of the defendant's confinement.
The Spiropoulos court invalidated section 5EI.2(i) on various
grounds. First, the court infered that, although the language of 5EI.2(i)
suggested otherwise, fines collected under the act do not, in fact, pay for
the costs of incarceration. 29  Rather, the court found the monies
collected from 5E1.2(i) are paid, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601(a) and
(b)(1) (West, 1992 Supp.), into the Crime Victims Fund which provides
grants to state programs for crime victim compensation, assistance, and
restitution.1 °
The Third Circuit concluded that notably absent from both 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553 and 357211 was any language which might authorize the
assessment of a fine to pay for the costs of a defendant's
imprisonment." 2 Specifically, the court found no specific reference in
those statutes to recouping the costs of imprisonment as an appropriate
goal of sentencing. Therefore, because recouping the costs of
imprisonment has nothing to do with the nature of the seriousness of the
offense, it is not authorized under section 3553(a)(1) or section
3553(a)(2)(A). 213  Aiding this conclusion, the Third Circuit did not
believe that assessing the costs of imprisonment, in addition to other
fines, deters criminal conduct, protects the public from further crimes, or
helps to rehabilitate the defendant.21 4
208. 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992).
209. United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 1992).
210. Id.
211. See supra note 37.
212. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d at 165. The basis of the court's conclusion rested on the fact that
these two provisions provided authorization for the Commission's promulgation of section 5E 1.2(i).
Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 165-66 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D)). The court rejected the
government's argument that the guideline is consistent with the Act if the Act authorizes courts to
consider victim compensation in sentencing defendants by finding:
We have no doubt that the assessment of a fine to pay for victim compensation and victim
restitution would be authorized by the Act. The language of the statute itself makes plain
the congressional desire to have victim compensation be a part of sentencing . ...
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The Spiropoulos court expressed doubts over the rationality of
section 5E1.2(i), believing the cost of a defendant's incarceration bears
no apparent relationship to the amount that a particular defendant's victim
has been injured.21  The court rejected the Hagmann position,
believing it fails to recognize that, when the purported statutory
justification for imposing section 5E1.2(i) fines is restitution, restitution
must be the governmental purpose the guideline serves. Because the
price of imprisonment is not a purpose of the Act, it is irrelevant in
evaluating the constitutionality of the guideline.216 The court failed to
find that the guideline advanced the restitutionary goals or the punitive
or deterrent purposes of the Act. It found that, because Congress did not
specifically authorize a section 5E1.2(i) fine, the Commission overstepped
its boundaries." Finally, the Spiropoulos court could not accept the
proposition that the cost of imprisoning a defendant relates to the amount
the defendant has harmed her victims, and the court found such a
sanction questionable as an appropriate method of restitution.2"'
The Third Circuit's position on section 5EI.2(i) has only been
adopted in that circuie 9 and was recently criticized in United States v.
Turner220 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. The Seventh Circuit refuted the notion espoused by the
Spiropoulos court that sections 3553 and 3572 do not authorize the
imposition of a fine by first looking at the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(c)(3) and (6). In those sections Congress told the Commission to
consider "not only the nature and degree of the harm caused by the
[Flines for victim compensation are justified as a means of effectuating the statutory goal
of restitution. Merely finding that restitution and victim compensation are legitimate
purposes of the Act does not, however, compel the conclusion that fines assessed under
§ 5EI .2(i) are authorized by the Act.
Id. at 166.
215. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d at 167 (emphasis in original). The court noted, however, that there
was generally a correlation between the amount of time a defendant is incarcerated and the
seriousness of her crime as well as between the amount of restitution a defendant owes her victims
and the seriousness of the defendant's crime. Id.
216. Id. at 168. The Third Circuit specifically found, however, that "sparing the taxpayers the
cost of imprisonment would likely be a constitutionally permissible governmental purpose, because
it is not specifically expressed in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3572, it should not be considered in
determining the constitutionality of § 5EI.2(i)." Id.
217. Id. at 168-69.
218. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d at 168.
219. See United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1330 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting "we recently held
the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize payment of incarceration costs .... [w]e explained
that [riecouping the costs of imprisonment has nothing to do with the nature or the seriousness of
the offense and that a fine based on the costs of incarceration was invalid.") (citing Spiropoulos, 976
F.2d at 168-69).
220. 998 F.2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 639 (1993).
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offense," but also "the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on
the commission of the offense by others."22' The court then read 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (B), which requires judges to impose
sentences that "reflect the seriousness of the offense" and "afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.""22 Considering that the
guidelines call for longer sentences as the harm caused by the offense
rises, the court concluded that the costs of confinement rise with the
seriousness of the offense, and the imposition of a fine based on these
costs therefore reflects the seriousness of the offense.223 The Turner
court found nothing in either 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 or § 994 which rejected
an approach to deterrence that includes the costs of custody among the
considerations that influence the selection of a fine.224  Assuming that
higher fines are more potent deterrents to crime, section 5E1.2(i)
therefore heightens the deterrence by increases the fine.22
The Seventh Circuit could not support the Spiropoulos court's
determination that section 5E1.2(i) failed the rational basis test. The
court concluded the rationality of the approach could not be doubted
because, while the costs of incarceration do not precisely reflect social
loss and deterrence, the Constitution does not require a close match
between the gravity of the offense and the penalty meted out.226 The
Turner court also rejected the argument that, because section 5E1.2(i)
funds are deposited into a victims of crime fund rather than given to the
Bureau of Prisons, they do not serve their intended purpose. 27  To
controvert this argument, the court, operating under the established
assumption that the function of section 5E1.2(i) is deterrence, concluded
that deterrence does not depend on what the government does with the
money. It is enough that the offender be deprived of wealth.22 From
221. 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(3), (6)(1993).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B) (1993). See United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 639 (1993).
223. Turner, 998 F.2d at 536.
224. Id. at 536-38.
225. Id. Specifically, the Turner court considered inapposite the Third Circuit's view that
assessing the costs of imprisonment did not deter criminal conduct, holding:
[t]his is the equivalent to asserting that higher fines do not increase deterrence, a
proposition that leaves us flabbergasted. The system of penalties under the guidelines is
construed on the belief that higher fines and longer sentences of imprisonment are
effective deterrents... Guideline § 5EI.2(i) increases the fines imposed on defendants,
and therefore increases deterrence.
Id. at 536.
226. Id. (citing Chapman v. United States, I I I S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (1991)).
227. Turner, 998 F.2d at 536-38.
228. Id.
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a defendant's perspective, the effect is the same if the money goes to
victims, the Bureau of Prisons, or an incinerator.
229
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also
refused to follow the Third Circuit's position. In United States v.
Orena,23° the Second Circuit noted the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have reached opposite conclusions from the Spiropoulos court
and held that the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly authorize the
imposition of a fine to cover the costs of incarceration.23' The Orena
court reasoned that the "defendants must reimburse society for the drain
on economic resources cause by their lives of crime and for the high
costs of their own necessary imprisonment.,
23 2
Other Circuits have refused to approach the issue and express
agreement or disagreement with the Spiropoulos decision. The United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit left the matter open in
United States v. Carrozza33 and found it inappropriate to answer the
question. In that decision, the First Circuit nonetheless viewed the
incarceration fine as one "which has divided our sister circuits" and felt
compelled to conclude that the district court did not commit plain error
in assessing the § 5E1.2(i) fine.234
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also
noted the different positions among the Circuits on § 5E1.2(i) in United
States v. Norman,2" but the court expressed neither agreement nor
disagreement with either position and declined to address the merits of




Section 5E 1.2(i) meets the threshold requirements of constitutionality
and courts should consider the section valid. To pierce the strong
229. Id.
230. 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 21898 (2d Cir. 1994).
231. Id. at *36 (citing Turner, Hagmann, and Doyan with approval).
232. Id. at *35.
233. 4 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 1993).
234. Id. at 83-84 (reviewing Turner, Spiropoulos, Hagmann, and Doyan). The First Circuit also
refused to resolve the dispute surrounding Spiropoulos on two other occasions. See United States
v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1993) (examining Turner, Spiropoulos, and Hagmann and failing
to resolve the conflict between the two Circuits because the defendant did not properly preserve that
issue on appeal); United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 572 n.4 (lst Cir. 1993) (noting Spiropoulos
and Turner and refusing to decide between the two). The Connell decision interpreted Carrozza as
"leaving the question open" in the First Circuit Connell, 6 F.3d at 29.
235. 3 F.3d 368 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
236. Id. at 369, n.3.
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presumption of constitutionality associated with any law passed by
Congress, section 5EI .2(i) must fail to be rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. Courts should conclude that a fine which mandates
that defendants shall reimburse the government for the costs of
confinement is clearly rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose because (1) the length of a defendant's prison sentence is directly
related to the harm she inflicts on society; (2) the government has a
legitimate interest in deterring criminal conduct; (3) fines provide
deterrent effects on criminal activity; and (4) the fine in question will be
greater for defendants with longer sentences who have inflicted greater
damage to society.
The argument that, because 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 and 3527 do not
specifically articulate that courts shall have the authority to impose this
fine, and therefore the Commission has overstepped its boundaries is
without merit. 28 U.S.C. § 991 lists, in pertinent part, the purpose of the
Sentencing Commission, to "establish sentencing policies and practices
for the federal criminal justice system that assure the meeting of the
purposes of sentencing as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 ...[and] to
reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."237 Notably absent
from both 28 U.S.C. § 991 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 is any language which
prohibits the Commission from developing sentencing practices which
empower courts to impose a section 5E1.2(i) fine.238 Because Congress
found the source of the previous system's deficiencies rooted in the
absence of a comprehensive federal sentencing law, they empowered the
Sentencing Commission with the authority to promulgate a uniform
sentencing system.239  Therefore, the guidelines represent the
Commission's attempt to comply with Congressional instructions; and, -if
the guidelines call for the imposition of an additional fine to reimburse
the government for the costs of incarceration, this order flows from
Congress and equates to law. Furthermore, because fines deter criminal
conduct, the fine flows from a knowledge of human behavior as it relates
to criminal justice and is, therefore, consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 991.
Finally, Congress created the guidelines to further the basic purposes
of criminal punishment; and consequently, they serve as defacto statutes.
Like statutes, courts look to and are controlled by the guidelines in
imposing sentences.24  Because they were indirectly passed by
237. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(I)(A), (C) (1993). See supra note 10.
238. United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 639 (1993).
239. See supra note 10.
240. See United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Congress does not necessarily imply that courts should afford them less
weight than statutes. District courts apply the guidelines in the same
fashion as Congressional statutes. Why should the guidelines fail to
possess the equivalent sovereignty statutes hold? Seven years of use in
federal courts should instill enough precedent in the guidelines so that
they may equate, in authority, to statutes. Ultimately, as long as the
guidelines are consistent with the statutorily defined objectives, the
Commission is within constitutional boundaries.24' The Commission
constantly amended 5E1.2 so that the guidelines remained commiserate
with Congressionally promulgated statutes.242 Nonetheless, should
circuit courts decide to follow the Third Circuit's position, Congress
should amend 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 and 3572 to reflect the validity of the
policy which requires prisoners to pay for their confinement.243
Viewing the government's payment of incarceration costs as a
"taxable event" engenders an interesting argument in support of section
5E1.2(i). Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "gross
income means all income from whatever source derived. ' 244  Gross
income includes income realized in any form, whether in money,
property, or services; income may be realized in the form of services,
meals, accommodations, stock, or other property as well as in cash.24
Following this definition, prisoners receive an economic benefit for which
they do not pay taxes. Furthermore, pursuant to I.R.C. § 108 (West
1994), the discharge of indebtedness can be perceived as income and
considered a taxable event. Prisoners are repaying society for the harm
they have inflicted on both their immediate victims and the
commonwealth; and they are, therefore, realizing income which should
be taxed.46 While these arguments may seem inapposite because
incarceration is clearly involuntary, assuming arguendo that imprisonment
is not entirely involuntary because it flows from the commission of a
voluntary criminal act, it can clearly be said that prisoners receive a
taxable economic benefit from the government in the form of free
241. Minstretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). See supra note 20.
242. See supra note 31.
243. In Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991), the court examined discord among United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal over the interpretation of United States Sentencing Guideline
§ IBI.2. The Court noted that in matters concerning federal law apart from the Constitution, the
Supreme Court is not the only body which could "eliminate such conflicts [among Circuits], at least
as far as their continuation into the future is concerned. Obviously, Congress itself can eliminate a
conflict concerning a statutory provision by making a clarifying amendment to the statute, and
agencies can do the same with respect to the regulations." Id. at 348.
244. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 1994).
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960).
246. See United States v. Bogan, 788 F. Supp. 433, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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accommodations.247 If any ordinary taxpayer were to receive the fringe
benefits of meals and lodging free of charge, this would constitute income
and a taxable event within the confines of section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Prisoners should, therefore, reimburse the government for
the taxable economic benefit which they receive in exchange for
committing voluntary criminal acts.
From a policy standpoint, section 5El .2(i) makes perfect sense. The
defendant, in perpetrating a criminal act, imposes an initial cost to
society. In response, society must then pay a second cost, the defendant's
imprisonment. Why should American taxpayers, who have a median
household income of $29,943 per year,2 48 be forced to pay the
government monies to incarcerate criminals just to guarantee their own
safety? Consequently, taxpayers absorb two costs, the damage of the
criminal act and the costs of confining the individual, and furthermore
pay monies to the government just to insure their personal safety, i.e.
taxes for prison costs. Moreover, incarcerating prisoners requires
American taxpayers to pay two rents: one for their own living
accommodations and another, in the form of a tax, to lodge prisoners.
Section 5E1.2(i) allows taxpayers to split the costs with criminals. The
argument that monies collected pursuant to section 5E1.2(i) do not
directly pay for prison costs is inapposite. The purpose of section
5E1.2(i) is to deter and punish criminal conduct. Imposing fines on
criminal defendants and depriving them of wealth serves both these
functions. The aims of section 5E 1.2(i) are satisfied once the deprivation
of property has occurred. After the money has been taken, where the
government specifically spends this money presents an entirely different
issue.
While the court may waive the fine if the defendant cannot pay for
the costs of incarceration, it appears that in some form or another, every
defendant can pay both the government and taxpayers for the cost of her
incarceration. All persons are employable in some way or another and
have access to at least twelve years of free education. In this time, even
basic motor skills are accumulated which may be employed to society's
247. Assuming that an employer/employee relationship exists between the government and
prisoners, the costs of incarceration would not fall within fringe benefit exclusion from gross income
found in I.R.C. § 132 (West 1994). Incarceration costs may, assuming such a relationship, fall within
the meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer exclusion from gross income
found in I.R.C. § 119 (West 1994).
248. See Michael Wines, Voting Yes on Trade Pact is Folly In Rust Belt. Or Is It?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1993, at Al, A20 (citation omitted). See also John Wagner, Census Findings: The
Northeast, WAsH. POST, July 20, 1992, at A13 (finding the national median household income was
$30,055 in 1989).
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benefit. Work is the essence of a person's identity. It defines how we
feel about ourselves and employ our human capital. Ordering community
service in return for the court's waiving the incarceration fine would
instill rehabilitational values. Each body in jail presents a resource which
could work to reimburse the government for prison costs.
Society is a social compact. Members of a society essentially agree
to refrain from inflicting harm on each other's person or property.
Without this compact, society could not function and utter chaos would
result. Once a criminal act violates this compact, the defendant should
assume certain responsibilities for his actions. Even those with minimal
training and education can procure some employment after prison which
will produce wages capable of garnishment. Such continuing loss, even
after the prison sentence has been served, punishes reprehensible conduct
and deters future violations.
Finally, while "those who are able to pay for their prison costs" do
not constitute a constitutionally protected class, section 5E1.2(i) clearly
discriminates against those persons who can pay. The court waives the
sanction for defendants who cannot pay while those who can must
reimburse the government. Rather than eriticize section 5E1.2(i) because
of this unequal treatment, courts should bring those who cannot pay the
fine within the realm of those defendants affected by the guideline.
Payment for incarceration need not be in actual cash but may also be
furnished in services. Moreover, paying defendants should receive
options unavailable to nonpaying defendants.249 This would act as an
incentive to promote payment and discourage hidden assets. Nonetheless,
it logically flows that the government has no choice but to waive the fine
for prisoners who cannot afford to pay and are not likely to become able.
Courts should, however, employ all possible alternatives, including
community service25° and work projects, to extract this cost from
defendants who are not likely to become able to pay.
249. It is interesting to note that in Columbia, leaders of the Medellin drug cartel built their own
prisons with cellular phones and fax machines. World Notes, Life in the Posh Lane, TIME
MAGAZINE, June 10, 1991, at 43. Perhaps the United States should follow this example and allow
prisoners who pay for their prison costs to flmish their cells with their own amenities rather than
charge the United States taxpayer.
250. See United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ferrin,
994 F.2d 658, 665 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that guidelines do not permit substitution of community
service for a fine). Even though the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held
that the guidelines do not permit the substitution of community service for a fine, defendants who
cannot pay have no other alternative means of payment than their human capital. Therefore,
community service, or any benefit confered upon society, which has already absorbed a loss from
the defendant's criminal act, should substitute for actual cash payment to reimburse incarceration
costs.
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For the foregoing reasons, section 5E 1.2(i) presents a constitutionally
permissible means to deter criminal conduct and ease the harm inflicted
on society from criminal acts. While courts may disagree over the proper
application and interpretation of the section, the guideline provides an
effective tool in the administration and adjudication of criminal justice.
James Charles Tecce
